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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FEDERAL LEASING, INC. and
LEWIS W. BUTCHER,
Plaintiff and ThirdParty Defendants Appellants,
v.
EADAC, ERNEST C. PSARRAS and
ANGELA PSARRAS,

Case No,

940329-CA

Plaintiff and ThirdParty Defendants Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the
District Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended 1994) and transfer from the Utah Supreme Court to
this Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended 1994).

Transfer was designated to the above court by-

notice of May 2 6, 1994.

Addendum p. 7.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the lower court have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues
affecting rights between parties, who, in the pleadings in the law
suit, were not adverse, where the issues presented for review had
not been raised either by amendment or consent?
1

This issue was

directed to the attention of the court both by objection to the
initial orders signed by the lower court on December 27 and 29,
1993,

respectively

(R-3265-3269) , and by argument of counsel at

hearings held before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on December
23,

1993

(T-3-7; 20-24) and on January 14, 1994

(T-60-100 and

specifically 65-70; 73-75; 98-99).
Whether the trial court had the right to hear the issues, not
raised

in

determined

the
on

pleadings, by
the

question

of

amendment
the

or

consent,

correctness

deference to the court below is required.

of

is
law

to

be

and

no

Sanderson v. First

Security Leasing Co. , 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992); Burns Chiropractic
Clinic v. All State Insurance Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1993) .
2 . Were certain of the findings and conclusions in the Second
Amended Order, as the same may affect the rights of appellants in
claims

against

appellants

and

as

objected

to

by

supported by substantial and competent evidence?

appellants,

This issue was

preserved in the record by the written objection of counsel and
arguments made to the court as set forth in paragraph 1 above.
Whether

the

court

below

erred

in

entering

findings

and

conclusions affecting rights of appellants based on a judgment that
had not addressed the issues sought to be established by the lower
court and that were contrary to the effect of rejection of an
executory contract and dismissal of a case under bankruptcy law is
a question of both fact and law.

The standard for review as to

questions of law is the correctness of law and no deference to the
court below is required.

Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co.,
2

supra and Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. All State Insurance Company,
supra.

As to the standard for review of findings of fact the

standard

is

to

determine

that

the

findings

are

supported

by

substantial and competent evidence. Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063
(Kan. 1987).
3. Did the court err in entering its Second Amended Order,
dismissing the lawsuit below, on terms and conditions to which
appellants, parties to the litigation, had objected, especially,
when appellants had agreed to dismissal of the case with prejudice.
This issue was preserved in the objection to the orders entered by
the court on December 27, 1993 and December 29, 1993, respectively
(R-3265-3269) , and the hearing held on January 14, 1994 (R-52-101;
specifically see R-75).
Whether the court below erred in allowing dismissal of the
case under terms to which appellants had objected is a question of
law and no deference to the court below is required.

Sanderson v.

First Security Leasing Co. , supra; Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. All
State Insurance Co., supra.
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
See Addendum
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Case
The case below involved an action by the plaintiffs, Federal
Leasing Inc. and EADAC, a partnership, to recover for the benefit
of EADAC, Ernest C. and Angela Psarras certain properties that the
latter at a previous time had assigned to the control of defendant,
3

Manifest Liquidating Trust, in which other defendants participated
as trustees to the trust or managed the properties.

R-0002-0053.

Involvement of Federal Leasing and Wendell Lewis Butcher resulted
from

a

Butcher

certain

agreement

entered

between

Federal

Leasing

and

(appellants herein) and EADAC, Ernest C. Psarras, Angela

Psarras (appellees herein) and Manivest Corporation dated April 22,
1991.

R-3316-3327.

The agreement contemplated joint action by

appellants and appellees against the defendants and appellants were
to manage, develop and sell certain properties claimed to be owned
by EADAC and the Psarrases.

Id.

This agreement is referred to

herein as Joint Venture Agreement or The Agreement.
A complaint was filed near May 20, 1991 by Federal Leasing and
EADAC against defendants (R-0002) with a subsequent counterclaim,
crossclaims

and

third

party

complaints

being

entered

joining

Wendell Lewis Butcher and the Psarrases, as well as others into the
action.

R-1157-0207.

During the process of extensive litigation

in the instant case differences between the interests of appellants
and appellees under The Agreement arose.

R-33 8 7 para. 5.

In a

suit in Dallas, Texas, between appellants and appellees a judgment
was rendered declaring that appellants had no interest in certain
real property of appellees (The Kingsley Park Apartments mentioned
in the Joint Venture Agreement).

R-3329-3331.

Further, in a

bankruptcy proceeding in the Central District of Utah, involving
appellants as debtors (subsequently dismissed), an order, based on
stipulation, rejecting The Agreement was entered.
and 3349.
4

R-3337-3338

The

controversies,

as

described,

between

appellants

appellees were not made a part of the instant litigation.

and

However,

on December 23, 1993 appellees, by motion, sought to settle the
proceedings with the defendants. R-3222-3233. With the motion for
settlement, appellees, for the first time, also sought to have the
lower court, based on the proceedings outside the lawsuit, declare
any rights of the appellants under The Agreement barred. R-32233233.
In proceedings before the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Third
Circuit Court Judge [sitting by assignment from the Third District
Court (R-2483)] the court, entered two separate orders dismissing
the

case.

R-3239-3244;

3253-3258.

These

orders

contained

findings of fact and conclusions of law which appellants

feel

substantively affect rights they claim against appellees, EADAC,
Ernest and Angela Psarras and Manivest Corporation, under The Joint
Venture Agreement of April 22, 1991.
To protect the rights of appellants and to preclude a future
determination that rights sought to be protected have been lost,
this appeal is brought.
(b) Course of Proceedings
Counsel for appellees, on December 22, 1993 filed a motion
seeking to approve settlement between appellees and the defendants
and a declaration that appellants be barred "... from any further
litigation of claims against any and all of the Settling Parties,"
including the appellees.

Memorandum

in Support of Motion

Approval of Settlement and Entry of Bar Order.
5

for

R-3225 at 3230.

Counsel asserted that a rejection order issued by the bankruptcy
court in the cases of Federal and Butcher terminated the agreement
of April 22, 1991 and rendered the same void. Id. at 3226-3227.
Further, counsel alleged that a certain summary judgment decision
from a court in Dallas, Texas adjudicating that appellants had no
rights in certain property claimed by appellees (called herein "The
Kingsley Property" in Dallas, Texas and mentioned in the 22nd of
April

Agreement),

that

appellants

were

thereby

estopped

from

asserting any rights under the agreement, including any rights to
any properties under the agreement.

Id. at 3229-3330.

The motion was filed with the court on December 22, 1993 at
4:50 p.m. with hearing thereon set for the following morning at
10:00

a.m.

before

the

Honorable

Michael

K.

Burton.

R-3222.

Certificate of service to listed counsel for appellants in the
instant case, David O. Black, was hand delivered on December 22,
1993.

R-3232-3233.

Also, the bankruptcy proceedings of Federal

and Butcher had been ordered dismissed on December 22, 1993, by the
Honorable

Glen

E.

Clark.

T-53.

However,

a

written

order

dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding was not signed until January
18, 1994.

Addendum p. 99.

Mr. David Day of the firm of Day and Barney appeared at the
hearing

the

next

morning

(December

23,

1993)

on

behalf

of

appellants, having received word from Mr. Butcher concerning the
hearing but a few minutes before.
not appear.

T-3.

Mr. David O. Black did

Mr. Day objected to the proceedings as they might

affect rights of appellants. T-20-21. After considerable argument,
6

the court directed that a response be filed by appellants by the
following Monday, December 27, 1993.

R-50.

Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, who, at that time was of counsel with
Day

&

Barney

acceptable

(T-18),

dismissal

negotiated

order,

with

other

and believing

arranged did not file any response.

T-63.

counsel

that

for

such had

an

been

However, the court

entered an order on December 27, 1993 and again on December 29,
1993.

Counsel for appellants believed these orders impaired rights

of the appellants and were
understood
appellants.

had

been

inconsistent with what Mr. Tycksen

arranged

R-3265-3269;

to

resolve

T-63-65.

the

objections

Therefore,

acting

of
in

appellants' interest, Mr. Steven C. Tycksen filed an objection to
the order and sought to have the same altered.

R-3265.

Additional

affidavits of other counsel regarding the discussions alleged to
have taken place by counsel between December 23, 1993 and the 27th
of the same month were filed and the matter was set for hearing on
the 14th of January, 1994.
At the hearing on the 14th of January Mr. Steven C. Tycksen,
on behalf of appellants

advised the court

that

the orders as

entered were inconsistent with the discussions he held with counsel
(T-63-65) , that certain of the findings and conclusions in the
signed order were outside the issues in the lawsuit and remedies
sought by appellants had not properly been noticed (T-67-69; 73-74)
and that dismissal with a bar against parties

to the

lawsuit

involving issues in the pending litigation would be acceptable to
appellants but certain of the findings and conclusions would not be
7

acceptable as they created a cloud on the claims of the appellants
against the appellees as to matters outside the suit.
In

response,

counsel

for

the

R-75; 82-83.

appellees, Mr. Doug

Parry,

advised the court he believed the appellants would retain right of
action

against

appellees

under

the

agreement

between

them,

notwithstanding the order as entered on December 27, 1993.

T-97-

98.
At the conclusion of the proceeding the judge invited the
parties to attempt to work out an acceptable adjustment to the
order or to submit alternative proposed orders.
Appellants'

counsel

submitted

R-99.

proposed

conclusions and order on January 19, 1994.

findings

and

R-3365-3369.

Mr. Parry submitted a proposed Second Amended Order on or near
January 19, 1994.

R-3304.

(c) Disposition in the Trial Court
On March 4, 19 94, the Honorable Michael K. Burton executed the
Second Amended Order, as submitted by counsel for appellees
3386-3391) .

However, the honorable

(R-

judge elected to make one

delineation in the decree portion of the Order, namely paragraph 3.
R-33 91.

This paragraph as submitted, and deleted had read:

3. Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns
predecessors, and successors in interests (sic) are barred
from asserting against any party to this lawsuit any right or
claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit.
(d) Statement of Relevant Facts.
In the complaint filed in the instant case it is alleged that
Mr. Ernest Psarras developed certain investments for himself and

8

others which were unfavorably affected by the tax laws of 1986.
R-0003 .
By

1988

certain

investors

in partnerships

Psarras desired to be cashed out.
defendants,

therefore,

formed

formed

by Mr.

Mr. Psarras and certain of the

Manivest

Liquidating

Trust

and

transferred thereto certain of his assets as well as the assets of
EADAC, a family partnership, to aid in the liquidation of the
interests of the various investors.

R-0003-0004.

An agreement

reciting the terms and obligations of the parties thereto was
executed on or near April 28, 1988, called the Manivest Liquidating
Agreement.

R-0044.

Subsequently, Mr. Psarras and the family

partnership, EADAC, felt that the members of the trust agreement
were not properly managing properties
detriment of Mr. Psarras and EADAC.

transferred,

R-0003 et. seq.

all to the
Complaint of

Plaintiff.
In an effort to try and preserve such interest as Ernest
Psarras, his wife, Angela, and EADAC might have, as related to the
Manivest

Liquidating

Trust,

an

agreement

(The Agreement)

was

entered between EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, and Manivest
Corporation, with Federal Leasing, Inc., a Utah corporation and
Lewis Butcher on April 22, 1991.

R-3316-3327.

The essence of the

Agreement was for Federal Leasing, Inc., and EADAC, collectively to
proceed against the Manivest Liquidating Trust and others in an
effort to try and recover certain properties as transferred to
Manivest Liquidating Trust, and for Federal Leasing or Mr. Butcher

9

to manage, maintain,

and

liquidate

Manivest Liquidating Trust.

the properties

in lieu of

Id.

Attached to the Agreement of April 22, 19 91, was an Exhibit
'A'

(R-3321)

which

identified

by

name,

and

not

by

legal

description, properties claimed to be owned by Mr. Psarras or
EADAC, which properties were to be a part of the Agreement.
3218-3221.

Included in the scheduled properties was the "Kingsley

Park Apartments" (Dallas, TX), unit 276.
By

R-

virtue

of

the

April

R-3323.

22, 1991 Agreement,

the

instant

litigation was commenced on or near May 20, 1991, with the rights
of Federal Leasing, "...to marshall whatever assets are left to
manage

and to effect meaningful

Defendants

responded

by

answer,

sales of the

same."

counterclaims

and

R-0006.

third-party

complaints, which brought Mr. Wendell Butcher, Ernest and Angela
Psarras

into

the

litigation.

R-0157-0207.

The

case

was

subsequently transferred to the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Third
Circuit Court Judge, Murray Department, Salt Lake County, Utah.

R-

2483.
Pleadings filed in the case are numerous and directed at
achieving relief by way of motion for summary judgment and orders
for compliance with court rulings; however, pleadings filed in this
case prior December 22, 1993, are not relevant to the issues raised
in this appeal, except to the extent that the issues now before the
appellate court were first brought to the attention of the trial
court, not by way of amended pleadings, but by way of motion to
allow settlement.

R-3223-3224.

Pleadings filed on or after the
10

December 22, 1993, raised issues between appellants and appellees
not previously

raised, and then the same were

raised

for the

purpose of obtaining settlement between appellants and defendants
and barring appellants from any claims they might have against
appellees under The Joint Venture Agreement.

Id. and subsequent

pleadings.
Following commencement of the above action differences between
Federal Leasing, Wendell Butcher (appellants) and EADAC, Angela and
Ernest Psarras (appellees) arose concerning rights of appellants in
the Kingsley Park Apartments in Dallas, Texas.

R-3208.

Suit was

instituted by appellees against appellants in the district court,
Dallas, Texas challenging appellants' claim of interest in the
Kingsley property.

R-3329.

On June 1, 1992, Mr. Lewis Butcher on

behalf of Federal Leasing Corporation filed a notice of interest in
real property on the Kingsley Park Apartments in Dallas, Texas.
R-3202.
Psarras

The suit initiated by EADAC Investment Company, Angela M.
and

Ernest

Corporation,

Federal

C.

Psarras

Leasing,

against

Inc.,

and

Carnicero
Lewis

Dynasty

Butcher

was

subsequently resolved by a final summary judgment on the 2 5th of
March 1993, the Honorable Lynn Skipworth, judge presiding. R-31943196.
In the final summary judgment ruling dated May 25, 1993, the
district court judge, made the following ruling, as pertinent to
this case:
The April 22, 1991, agreement between plaintiffs, EADAC
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest C.
Psarras, and defendants, Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis
Butcher (the "Agreement") , a copy of which is attached to
11

this order as Exhibit 'A' , is executory in nature and
defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal
Leasing, Inc., and Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal
or equitable to the following described real property
situated in Dallas County, Texas:
(Emphasis Added) R3329.
The legal description of the property is then given.

The

Texas court determined that a notice of interest filed by Federal
Leasing did not create an interest in the property in any of the
defendants and because The Agreement

(April 22, 1991) failed to

identify the property in issue with reasonable certainty it was
unenforceable as failing to satisfy the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds.

R-3330.

The matter before the Texas court involved

only the Kingsley property.

R-3329-3331.

Following the entry of the decree from the district court in
Dallas, Texas, Federal Leasing Corporation on March 29, 1993, and
Wendell Lewis Butcher, on April 7, 1993, respectively, filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.

R-3333-3335.

During the course of

appellants' bankruptcy litigation between Psarrases, EADAC and the
other defendants continued.
Near July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed in the bankruptcy court a
motion to compel appellants to assume or reject as an executory
contract The Joint Venture Agreement.

R-3337.

Prior to the date

of hearing Federal Leasing Corporation and Wendell Butcher entered
into a stipulation for rejection, dated November 10, 1993, with
counsel

for

the

Psarrases

acknowledging

"...

that

each

party

asserts that the other party has defaulted and breached the terms
of the agreement, and that such alleged defaults and breaches make
it impossible for Butcher to assume the agreement under 11 USC
12

Section 365."

See R-3337.

An order was entered by the Honorable

Glen E. Clark, pursuant to the stipulation on November 22, 1993,
rejecting the agreement of April 22, 1991.
At

or

near

the

time of

the

R-3349-3350.

rejection

appellants negotiated a proposed settlement
defendants in the instant case.

of

The Agreement,

agreement with the

Mr. Douglas Parry, attorney for

appellants, on December 22, 1993, at 4:50 p.m.

(R-3223) filed a

motion for approval of settlement and entry of bar order. A notice
of hearing was also filed at the same time scheduling a hearing for
the following morning, namely December 23, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. R3222.
In support

of

the motion

for

settlement

and bar

against

Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis W. Butcher, counsel argued: (1)
that the rejection of the agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding
constituted a breach and termination of the agreement (R-3227); (2)
that failure of performance on the part of Butcher and Federal
Leasing was found by the Texas court (R-3228) and (3) that under
the ruling of the Texas court, because appellants had no rights
under The Agreement with respect to the Kingsley Property, they
also had no rights in The Agreement.

R-3229-3230.

Though the notice certified hand delivery to Mr. David O.
Black, listed as counsel for plaintiffs, on December 22, 1993 (R3232-3233) , Mr. Black did not appear; rather, Mr. David Day, at
request of Mr. Butcher appeared on the morning of the 23rd.
Mr. Black attempted to withdraw as of December 22, 1993.
3261.

T-5.

R-3259-

At the hearing on December 23, 1993, Mr. Day of the firm of
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Day & Barney, advised the court that he had received a call from
Mr. Butcher concerning the hearing after Butcher received notice
from Mr. David Black concerning the matter only moments before the
hearing.

T-5-6.

Mr. Day objected to inadequate notice (T-6) and

requested opportunity to make a response by the following Monday.
The court granted until noon on the following Monday in which to
respond in writing.

T-49-50.

Between the date of the 23rd of December and the following
Monday, certain conversations were held between counsel for the
parties, including Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, who had assisted Federal
Leasing in its bankruptcy. T-55.

Mr. Tycksen understood that the

case would be settled between appellees and defendants and the
rights of appellants against appellees would be reserved.

T-60-63.

Because Mr. Tycksen felt the issues concerning appellants had been
resolved no response was filed.

T-63.

However, the Honorable

Michael K. Burton signed an order as presented on December 27, 1993
which order contained

findings and conclusions

as proposed

by

appellees' counsel barring rights of appellants, contrary to the
understanding of Mr. Tycksen.
order

on

complaint

December

29,

1993,

T-63-65.
which

The court then executed an
dismissed

court

plaintiff's

as amended, defendant's counterclaims as amended and

third-party complaint's with prejudice.
the

the

also

executed

an

amended

R-3251.
order

On the same date

which,

with

minor

modifications in language and some phraseology, in essence covered
the same matters as the order signed December 27, 1993.
3258.
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R-3253-

On January 6, 1994, on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc., and
Lewis W. Butcher, Mr. Steven C. Tycksen filed an objection to the
order and amended order and sought a motion to amend and hearing.
R-3265.
Hearing on the motion to amend was held on January 14, 1994,
before Judge Burton.

T-52.

Mr. Steven C. Tycksen appeared on

behalf of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing.

Mr. Moxley

appeared on behalf of the settling defendants, and Mr. Douglas
Parry appeared on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Psarras and EADAC.

T-52

et. seq.
Mr. Tycksen advised the court that his clients did not object
to the conclusion of the lawsuit as to all parties

(T-62) ; that

given discussions held between himself and other counsel he did not
follow-up in writing to the court by the 27th as he was under the
impression that matters had been properly resolved. T-63.

He

stated he had received a copy of an order signed by the court
without having had opportunity to approve the same (T-64-65) and
further indicated that the order exceeded any of the relief sought
in the suit, as related to appellants, and that it had extraneous
findings and collateral orders creating confusion as to the rights
of his clients. T-65.
Mr. Tycksen suggested that the court had been asked to make
findings of fact and conclusions which were either incorrect based
upon the information provided or were outside the parameters of the
lawsuit.

T-68. He indicated that the collateral estoppel question

raised in the order was never a part of the existing lawsuit and
15

that reasonable notice and opportunity to defendant had not been
afforded his clients. T-69.

He also pointed out that though there

was no objection to suggesting that the case be terminated, a claim
that

the

rights

of

Mr.

Butcher

and

Federal

Leasing

in

the

settlement agreement would be ineffective, would be incorrect as
The

Agreement

appellants
efforts.

between

would

appellants

obtain one-half

and
of

appellees
proceeds

provided

gained

by

that
their

T-73-74.

Mr. Tycksen reminded the court that both parties (appellants
and appellees) under the rejection stipulation had claimed that the
other had breached and that issue needed to be determined.

T-74.

He also stated his clients had no objection to the entry of a bar
with respect to claims of his clients as to issues in the given
lawsuit, but

other decisions were unnecessary

interest of his clients. T-75.

and clouded

the

Also mentioned was the fact that

Mr. Tycksen had not been afforded the courtesy, as required by
rules of practice, to have an opportunity to review the order
before it was submitted to the court.

T-76.

In counter-argument Mr. Parry, on behalf of the Psarrases and
EADAC

indicated

deprived

his

appellants

view

that

to any

the

rights

order
in

(December

the proposed

27,

1993)

settlement

agreement but did not deprive them of the right to assert claims
against the appellees under The Agreement of April 22, 1991. T-9798.
At the hearing's conclusion the court requested that each side
submit a proposed order in the event counsel could not come to an
16

agreement. T-99.
On January 19, 1994, there was filed by appellant's counsel
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law together with an
order

directing

settlement

of

the

lawsuit

and

dismissal

with

prejudice, reserving however, claims, rights, and obligations as
may exist between Lewis W. Butcher and Federal Leasing, and EADAC,
Ernest and Angela Psarras.

R-3365-3369.

Mr. Parry submitted to the court a Second Amended Order and a
Post Hearing Memorandum (R-3305) to which an objection was filed by
appellant's

counsel. R-3371.

The Honorable Michael K.

Burton

executed the Second Amended Order on March 4, 1994, striking,
however,

paragraph

3 of

the

Decree.

R-3391.

See

also

(c)

of

fact

and

Disposition in the Trial court, supra.
The

Second

Amended

Order

retained

findings

conclusions of law objectionable to Butcher and Federal Leasing
that, in the judgment of appellant's counsel, might impact the
rights of appellants to make claims against appellees under the
Joint Venture Agreement.
From such findings, conclusions and order appellants make this
appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

lower

court

lacked

jurisdiction

to adjudicate

issues

between appellants and appellees asserted in the case at the time
appellees were seeking settlement and dismissal of the litigation
where the issues raised had not been raised previously in the suit
by way of amendment or tried by express or implied consent pursuant
17

to URCP Rule 15(a) and (b) . Further, certain findings of fact and
conclusions

of

law

substantial

and

entered

competent

by

the

court

evidence, were

were

not

contrary

based

to

law

on
and

inconsistent with the actual proceedings held before the court.
A trial court does not have the right to determine an issue
which has not been properly raised, even if it has jurisdiction
over the parties and the power to hear the controversy.

Wanless v.

D. Land Title, 790 P. 2d 568 (Utah App. 1990) . Issues not raised by
pleadings may be brought into a suit by amendment, after notice and
hearing, [URCP 15(a)] or where tried by express or implied consent
[URCP 15(b)] . However, where an issue, not before the court by way
of amendment, is sought to be raised over objection no amendment
will be implied and the issue may not be determined.

Pacheco v.

Martinez, 636 P.2 308 (N.M. App. 1981).
A judgment rendered against a party is not res judicata as to
matters that were not determined by the court.
285 P. 2d 839
contract

in

(Utah 1955) .
a

bankruptcy

Todaro v. Gardner,

Further, rejection of an executory
proceeding

does

not

constitute

a

rescission of the agreement and the rights of the parties accrued
under the agreement to the time of rejection are preserved.

In re

Rudaw\Empirical Software Products Ltd., 83 B.R. 241 (Bkrtcy S.D.
N.Y. 1988); R and O Elevator Co., Inc. v. Harmon, 93 B.R. 667 (D.
Minn. 1988) . Also, dismissal of a case in bankruptcy

operates to

reinstate the rights and interests of the debtor and his creditors
to their status quo ante.

In re Lawson, 156 B.R. 43 (9th Cir.BAP

19 93) . Therefore, findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted
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by the court based upon proceedings in other courts were contrary
to law and unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.

See

Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., supra, Burns Chiropractic
Clinic v. All State Insurance Company, supra and

Stauth v. Brown,

734 P. 2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) .
A

trial

court

is not

entitled

to place

upon

a party

a

dismissal order which is unacceptable to that party; rather, the
court must allow the party to proceed with the litigation in lieu
of dismissal.

Powers v. Professional Rodeo Cowboy's Assoc., 832 P.

2d 1099 at 1104 (Colo. App. 1992).
Certain of the findings of fact and conclusions of law as
entered by the lower court, which affect the claims of appellants
against appellees must be abrogated, as the same constitute a cloud
upon rights of appellants which have not been given appropriate
opportunity

for

review

and

are

based

upon

incompetent

and

insubstantial evidence.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE
EVIDENCE OR TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW# OR ENTER AN ORDER RELATING TO RIGHTS AND CLAIMS
BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE ACTION, WHOSE INTERESTS AND LEGAL
RIGHTS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS PREVIOUSLY
EXCEPT AS RAISED BY THE MOTION FOR SETTLEMENT AND BAR
ORDER•
Jurisdiction or the right to determine a cause is usually
divided as jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction
over the parties.

See State v. Bickford, 672 P.2d 607 (Kan. 1983) .
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For jurisdiction over a party, a party must appear before the
court,

generally,

or

submit

to jurisdiction

of

the court

and

jurisdiction over the subject matter must be within the power of
the court to hear and determine a cause.

Id. at 609.

The right of

a trial court to determine an issue not raised by the pleadings,
amendment or consent is a question of correctness of law and no
deference to the court below is required.

Sanderson v. First

Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992); Burns Chiropractic
Clinic v. All State Insurance Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1993) .
A

court

controversy

must

have

in order

subject

matter

to proceed;

without

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed.
v. All State Insurance Co., supra.

jurisdiction
such

over

subject

a

matter

Burns Chiropractic Clinic

Parties to a proceeding may not

by acquiescence confer jurisdiction upon a court where jurisdiction
would

otherwise

be

lacking.

A.

J.

Construction, 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991).

Mackay

Co.

v.

Oakland

Even where the court has

the parties and subject matter before it, it still has no right to
try an issue that has not been properly raised before the court.
See Wanless v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1990) .
Our court has recognized that a fundamental requisite of due
process is an opportunity to be fully heard.
Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987) .

See Wiscombe v.

Proper notice required

must be such that is reasonably calculated to afford the informant
an opportunity to be heard at a proper time and in a proper manner.
Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept. . 616 P. 2d 598 at 601-602
1980) .
20

(Utah

To

bring

an

issue

between

parties

into

an

action,

not

originally brought before the court, Rule 15(a) URCP allows a party
to amend a pleading by leave of court, with opportunity for a
response and hearing.

Alternatively, under Rule 15(b) URCP where

issues are not raised by the pleadings but are tried by express or
implied consent they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings.

Additionally, if new issues are

sought to be raised at trial over objection of an opposing party
the court may "... allow the pleadings to be amended ..." if the
presentation

of

the

merits

will

be

subserved

and

the

court

determines that the opposing party will not thereby be prejudiced.
Rule 15(b) URCP.

However, where evidence material to an issue is

not covered by pleadings but is admitted over an objection at trial
and the pleadings have not been amended no amendment will be
implied.

Pacheco v. Martinez, 636 P.2d 308 (N.M. App. 1981).

In the Pacheco case, supra, the court determined that the
office of pleadings is to afford the parties to an action fair
notice of both the claims and defenses and the grounds upon which
such exist; the court may not amend sua sponte and such issues so
attempted are not properly before the court.
In the Wanless case, supra, the issue plead to the court was
whether a relationship between parties constituted a partnership.
On an affirmative ruling by the jury plaintiff then asked the court
to grant a claim for a percentage of the value of the partnership
under Rule 15(b) URCP, as an issue tried by express or implied
consent.

On appeal the court determined that it would be improper
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for the lower court to enter an order relative to valuation where
the issue of valuation had not been brought into the dispute either
by express or implied consent or by the pleadings.
In the instant case, the parties, namely Federal Leasing and
Lewis Butcher, were before the court, having either brought the
complaint or having been joined by way of third party action.

As

well, EADAC was a plaintiff and Ernest and Angela Psarras had been
brought

into

the

action

by

way

of

third

party

complaint.

Therefore, the parties (appellants and appellees) were before the
court.
Likewise, counsel for appellants would acknowledge that the
district court

(and by assignment, the circuit court) would have

been a proper forum to hear the question of collateral estoppel and
the

effect

subsequent

of

the

rejection

of

the

executory

contract

and

dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings between the

parties had there been proper amendment and opportunity for due
process

with

respect

thereto;

that

is to

say

had

there

been

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.

See Worrall v. Ocrden City Fire Department, supra.

The

meaningful manner would have been opportunity to have the issues
between the parties established with the rights of discovery and
marshalling of evidence for subsequent adjudication by trial or
summary judgment.

Such was argued but was not afforded.

See T-52-

101 arguments of Mr. Tycksen at hearing of January 14, 1994.
As above indicated, under Rule 15 (b) URCP when issues are not
raised by the pleadings but are tried by express or implied consent
22

they may be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings.

But where objection is made to issues not raised by

the pleadings the court is not permitted to proceed forward as such
issues would not be properly before the court.

See Pacheco v.

Martinez, supra.
In the above

case, appellants

submit

that

the

court

was

without jurisdiction over the subject matter of issues that arose
post filing of the complaint between Federal Leasing and Butcher
and it's initial allies, EADAC and Ernest and Angela Psarras.

It

is true that the court, after the issues were raised, did afford
opportunity for hearing concerning the nature of the final order to
be entered regarding settlement.

However, the issues as between

the parties had never been raised in the pleadings with opportunity
for reasonable and meaningful response nor had the issues been
tried by express or implied consent.

As a consequence, the court

did not have authority to act in the case, either because the court
was without subject matter jurisdiction as the subject issues had
not been raised or the issues having been brought to the attention
of the court were reviewed [not tried under Rule 15(b) URCP] over
objection and without consent of parties whose interests were to be
affected namely, Federal Leasing and Lewis W. Butcher.

See Pacheco

v. Martinez, supra, see also Wanless v. D Land Title, supra.

POINT II
CERTAIN OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MADE BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO ITS ORDER OF MARCH 4,
1994, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE RULINGS OF THE FOREIGN
COURTS AND CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT:
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a. The ruling of the Texas Court is not a bar to claims
between appellants and appellees, except as to the
controversy concerning the Kingsley property.
b. The rejection of the Joint Venture Agreement in
bankruptcy court was not a rescission and rights of the
parties were in any event reinstated upon dismissal
c. The combination of the decision of the Texas court and
the rejection in bankruptcy court did not render the
Joint Venture Agreement null and void.
d. The finding that appellant's did not respond to the
motion of the appellees for a bar order is misleading.
Introduction.
The Second Amended Order adopted by the court contains certain
findings of fact and conclusions of law to which appellants object
as potentially affecting rights they claim against appellees. They
break down as follows:
1. That under the ruling of the Texas court appellants
are without rights under The Agreement or are estopped to
assert rights in that they did not perform thereunder
(Finding no. 6 and Conclusion 1) , The Agreement was null
and void (Finding No. 11) and appellants had no rights or
claims against any party to the action arising out of the
litigation (Conclusion nos. 1, 4 and 5 ) .
2. That the rejection of the appellants of The Agreement
in the bankruptcy court terminated the agreement as a
matter of law. Conclusion no. 2.
3. That the force of the ruling of the Texas court and
the

bankruptcy

court,

allowing

rejection

of

The

Agreement, left appellants without any rights and claims
under The Agreement or the suit. Finding no. 11.
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4. That appellants failed to provide any written response
to

the

Motion

for Bar

Order

by

December

27, 1993.

Finding no. 12.
Additionally,

Conclusions

of

Law

5

and

6

suggest

that

appellants were neither entitled to notice of a hearing on the bar
order nor did they have any rights in a settlement agreement to be
reached between other parties.

Because appellants had short, but

actual notice and opportunity to respond in limited fashion and,
further, because appellants had no objection to other parties'
arranging

settlement,

these

conclusions

(5

and

6)

are

not

is

the

significant to the relief sought by appellants.
The

standard

for

review

as

to

questions

of

law

correctness of law and no deference to the court below is required.
Sanderson

v.

First

Security

Leasing

Co.,

supra

and

Burns

Chiropractic Clinic v. All State Insurance Company, supra.

As to

the standard for review of findings of fact the standard is to
determine

that

the

competent evidence.
II. a.

findings

are

supported

by

substantial

and

Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) .

The Texas Ruling.

The only evidence presented to the court with respect to the
Texas

case was a copy of a Final

Summary Judgment.

R-332 9.

Finding of Fact 5 of The Second Amended Order indicates:
Upon contracting to sale the Kingsley Property, a dispute
arose between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the
enforceability of the Agreement.
As a consequence, EADAC
filed an action against Federal Leasing and Lewis Butcher in
the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H
(the "Texas Case").
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Finding 6 indicated:
By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Court
granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the
Agreement was "executory in nature" and that Lewis Butcher and
Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder."
Based on the assumption of the validity of these findings,
Conclusions 1 and 4 of the Second Amended Order were adopted to
read:
1. As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in
the Texas Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally
estopped from asserting against any party to this action any
rights or claims arising out of the substance of this
litigation.
4. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights
under the Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this
lawsuit.
Though Conclusion 1 speaks of claims "... arising out of the
substance of this litigation..."
involved

in the

"substance" must

(the instant suit) the claims
likewise

include

those

which

appellants challenged and sought to preserve, otherwise, appellees
counsel would not have been so insistent

in having the Second

Amended Order entered, given the opportunity to have settled the
case without objection of the appellants.
Hearing Memorandum Re:

R-3305 et. seq. Post

Amending Order.

There is no indication in the single document submitted that
the issue before the Texas court disputed performance under The
Agreement; nor is there anything in the decree to support the
finding that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights under The
Agreement due to the fact that neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing
had performed thereunder.

R-3329-3331.
26

The Texas decree, as submitted by counsel, read at paragraph
(a) as follows:
The April 22, 1991, agreement between plaintiffs,
EADAC Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest
Psarras, and defendants, Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis
Butcher (the agreement) a copy of which is attached to
this order as Exhibit 'A', is executory in nature, and
defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal
Leasing, Inc, and Lewis Butcher have no rights, legal or
equitable to the following described real property
situated in Dallas County, Texas.
The property is then described.
At paragraph (b) the court further states:
The Agreement does not provide, by itself or by
reference to some other existing writing, sufficient data or
other means by which the Property to be conveyed may be
identified with reasonable certainty.
As a result, the
Agreement is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
There is nothing in the decree to establish that it rested
upon the failure of Lewis Butcher or Federal Leasing to perform The
Agreement.

Further, the decree decided an issue relative to the

April 22, 1991 Agreement in reference to a certain parcel of ground
in Dallas County, Texas.
liens

held

by

Carnicero

Specifically, the court ruled that any
Dynasty

Corporation

(a

designated

defendant) from an assignment of Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company
against the "Property" (Kingsley) were void.

R-3330.

The decree

does not indicate that the other properties mentioned in Exhibit A
to the Agreement were at issue.

R-3329-3331.

The declaration of unenforceability of The Agreement under the
Texas decision ran to the enforceability of the claims of the
defendants under The Agreement with respect to the Kingsley Park
North Apartments and not to other matters. There is nothing in the
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Texas decree to suggest that the court considered or that an issue
was raised as to whether defendants had performed services under
The Agreement or whether they were entitled to compensation for
services rendered or advances made.

A judgment rendered against a

party will be res judicata as to the issues decided by the court
but

the

judgment

cannot

determined by the court.

be

res

judicata

as

to

matters

not

Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d. 839 (1955);

cf. Wanless v. D Land Title, supra.
As a consequence, Finding 6 and Conclusions 1 and 4 are not
supported
removed.

by

substantial

and

competent

evidence

and

must

be

See Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063 (Kansas 1987).

II. b.

Rejection and Dismissal in Bankruptcy.

Finding

8 of

the

appellants

and

Agreement,

an executory

stipulation

was

Second Amended

appellees

approved

stipulated

Order
to

a

acknowledges
rejection

contract, under bankruptcy
by

the

court

and

a

that

of

The

law, which

rejection

order

entered. R-33 88. Appellants' bankruptcy cases, per Finding 9, were
ordered dismissed from the bench on Monday, December 20, 1993.

Id.

A written order was not entered until January 18 1994. Addendum p.
99.
Conclusions 2, 3 and 4 of the Order of Judge Burton were based
on Findings 8 and 9, which read:
2.
Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the
Agreement in the Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a
matter of law to terminate the Agreement. (Emphasis added).
3.
Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this
lawsuit, if any, are wholly contingent upon the terms of the
Agreement.
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4 . Because Butcher and Federal have no rights under the
Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit. (See
also Conclusion 5)
The position asserted by counsel for appellees as to the
effect of rejection of The Agreement in bankruptcy was misleading
to the court and also inconsistent in law.

Also of importance is

the fact that the bankruptcy case, in which the rejection was
accomplished, was dismissed within approximately 3 0 days after the
entry of the order rejecting the contract which rejection occurred
by stipulation.

R-3388 paras. 8 and 9; R-3349.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding and its effect is defined
in

11

USC

dismissal

Section
under

349

349.
(b)

The

legislative

states,

"The

history

basic

concerning

purpose

of

the

subsection is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable,
and to restore all property rights to the position in which they
were found at the commencement of the case."

H.R.Rep. No. 595,

95th Cong., 1st Sess., 337-338 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News
1978, pp. 5787, 6294; cited in In re Lawson, 156 B.R. 43

(9th

Cir.BAP 1993) .
Unless a court otherwise orders, the effect of an order of
dismissal

is

to

restore

the

status

quo

ante

bankruptcy case had never been brought.

In re

Inc. , 159

1993) .

B.R.

188

(Bkrtcy. W.D.

PA.

as

though

the

Lewis & Coulter,
The

effect

of

dismissal according to the court in In re Lewis & Coulter, supra,
is to undo the bankruptcy case as far as practicable and restore
all property rights to the position where they were found at the
commencement of the case. The estate reverts upon dismissal to the
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debtor and is subject to all encumbrances in existence prior to the
bankruptcy proceeding.

A debtor's property and debts are subject

to general laws unaffected by bankruptcy law. Id. at 190 - 191.
Because the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed, the debtors
would have been restored to their respective positions status quo
ante, or in other words as existed prior to the bankruptcy, unless
the court had otherwise ordered or the law otherwise directed.
re

Lewis

& Coulter,

supra.

That

is to

say,

appellants

In
and

appellees would have been reinstated to their respective rights,
claims and defenses against each other as were established before
filing of bankruptcy as though the case had never been filed.

Id.

at 190.
Because

the

bankruptcy

dismissal

order

sets

forth

no

conditions of dismissal (Addendum p. 96) one must look at the order
of rejection to determine what effect it may have upon the debtors
and their claimants. Neither the order rejecting The Agreement (R3349) nor the stipulation on which the order is based (R-3337-3338)
sets forth any conditions other than The Agreement is rejected.
Under

Section

11 USC

365(g)

a rejection

of

an

executory

contract is treated as a breach and affords the injured party the
right to file a claim for damages under 11 USC 502(g).

Matter of

Federated Department Stores, Inc., 131 B. R. 808 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio
1991) .

Rejection, in a bankruptcy proceeding usually includes a

contract under which performance remains to be done to some extent
on both sides.

In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 115 B.R. 738 at 743

(Bkrtcy D. Mass. 1990) .

The purpose behind allowing rejection or
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assumption of an executory contract is to enable a troubled debtor
to take advantage of a contract that would benefit the estate or
alternatively would relieve the estate of a burdensome contract by
rejecting.
However,

In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224 at 225
rejection

of

an

executory

contract

(Bkrtcy. 1984) .
does

not

undo

performances by the parties to the contract, either pre-petition or
post-petition, which have preceded the assumption or rejection.
Therefore, performance completed by the debtor or by other parties
pursuant to an agreement in issue are not affected by the debtor's
rejection.

In re Metro Transportation Co., 87 B. R. 338 at 343

(Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1988) . In other words, rejection of an executory
contract by a bankrupt debtor does not rescind the contract or the
obligations found therein; rather the rejection constitutes nothing
more than a pre-petition breach of contract.

Udell v. Standard

Carpetland USA, Inc., 149 B.R. 908 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
Termination of a rejected contract that will not be reinstated
following dismissal involves circumstances where the agreement was
terminated

under

bankruptcy

law

or

from

actions

termination during the bankruptcy proceeding.

establishing

See, e.g. In re BSL

Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1986), where debtor
allowed a lease to be rejected automatically pursuant to 11 USC
Section 365(d)(4) and after dismissal of the case the debtor,
lessee,

was

determined

not

to have

rights

to have

the

lease

reinstated with dismissal as it was not one of the reinstating
factors under 349(b) and the rights of the lessor had vested at the
time of rejection.

Likewise, in In re Newton, 64 B.R. 790 (Bkrtcy.
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CD.111.

1986) debtor, after executing

a lien arrangement

for

unplanted crops, filed bankruptcy before planting the crops and
sold the harvested crop to a third party.

The court determined

that the rights of the third party became vested as part of the
bankruptcy process and the lending bank would not be reinstated to
its lien claim position following dismissal.
In the instant case, rejection of the executory contract was
executed

upon

stipulation

of

the

parties

which

stipulation

recognized that there were claims of breach by both parties.
3337.

R-

The rejection of the executory contract had only the effect,

so long as the case remained in bankruptcy, of terminating any
further obligation of performance by Federal Leasing and Butcher,
granted a claim pre-petition to EADAC and Psarrases for breach of
contract and excused any subsequent performance of the unperformed
aspects of the agreement on the part of EADAC and Psarrases.

See

In re RudawXEmpirical Software Products Ltd, 83 B.R. 241 at 246
(Bkrtcy S.D.N.Y. 1988)

The rejection did not alter the claims and

rights of the parties as may have existed prior to the time of
rejection.

See In re Metro Transportation Co., supra.

In the instant case there was no evidence presented to the
lower court, nor was any offered to indicate that on rejection the
contract was rescinded
supra),

or

terminated

(Udell v. Standard Carpetland USA, Inc.,
(In

re

BSL

Operating

Corp.,

supra).

Therefore, the effect of the rejection and subsequent dismissal
restored the parties to such position as though no bankruptcy case
had been brought.

See In re

Lewis & Coulter, Inc., supra.
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Such

rights and claims as Federal Leasing and Lewis Butcher, EADAC, and
Psarrases

may

have

had

with

respect

to

each

other

prior

to

bankruptcy were restored at the time of dismissal of the bankruptcy
case.

Consequently, since the rejection of The Agreement in the

bankruptcy proceeding was not a termination (rescission) (Udell v.
Standard Carpetland USA, Inc., supra) and rights, pre-petition were
reinstated to appellants and appellees, Conclusions 2-4

(and as

related, Conclusion 5) are unsupported by competent evidence and
are inconsistent with law and must be abrogated from the order of
the lower court.

See Stauth v. Brown, supra.

II. c. The Combination of the Texas and Bankruptcy Rulings.
Finding no. 11 of the Second Amended Order suggests that given
both the Texas ruling and the rejection of The Agreement in the
bankruptcy court The Agreement was "... null and void . . .therefore
leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without

rights and

claims

thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action."
3389.
2-4

R-

Conclusions 5 and 6 express that as a result of Conclusions

(relating to the bankruptcy rejection) and Conclusion 1 (the

Texas decision) that appellants were neither entitled to notice nor
were they necessary parties to any settlement agreement.
Elementary math would suggest, "Quantities equal to the same
quantities are equal to each other."

As set forth in discussion

II. a. and II. b., above, neither the Texas court ruling nor the
bankruptcy rejection rendered the Agreement, as between appellants
and appellees, void or rescinded.

Therefore, if neither foreign

court ruling would extinguish all rights of appellants against
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appellees how can it be said that the combination of the two would
do so?

Zero plus zero is still zero.

In argument to the court at the January 14, 19 94, hearing, Mr.
Parry for appellees argued that the entry of the proposed order
would not restrict the rights of appellants against appellees.
97-98.

Nevertheless,

in

submitting

the

Second Amended

T-

Order

counsel was careful to leave intact those portions of the order as
challenged by appellants' counsel and argued for the same. R-3305Post Hearing Memorandum.

As set forth in appellants' Point II. a.

and b. there is no basis to sustain any finding or conclusion that
rights of appellants against appellees were extinguished by either
or both rulings of the stated courts.
It is true that the decision in Texas decided that appellants
had no claim to the real property in issue in that case.

However,

The Agreement provided that appellants would share in the proceeds
of properties recovered and be reimbursed for expenses. R-3320
Paras. G and H.

Certainly, a finding that appellants had no rights

in property inadequately described would not preclude a claim for
expenses and compensation otherwise allowed under The Agreement.
Likewise, even assuming the bankruptcy rejection of The Agreement
terminated

rights and obligations

of the parties,

it did

not

prevent a claim for breach by appellees against appellants nor did
it preclude claims and defenses of appellants accrued as of the
date of rejection.

See In re Metro Transportation Co., supra.

The finding of the lower court that the rulings of the Texas
court and bankruptcy court, rejecting the Agreement, rendered the
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Agreement null and void, leaving appellants without rights and
claims

against

reasonable

and

findings

and

conclusions in support of such a position must be stricken.

See

competent

appellees,

evidence.

is not

Therefore,

supported
the

by

challenged

Stauth v. Brown, supra.
II. d. Appellants Failure to Respond.
Finding 12 (R-3389) suggests that although appellants at a
hearing on December 23, 1993 were afforded an opportunity to file
a written response by noon on Monday, December 27, 1993, none was
filed.

The finding, as written, is correct but is also misleading

as to the events that transpired.

As the finding is approved by

the court one would assume that the Order was entered by the court
after opportunity to be heard was given and no response was made.
In the hearing of January 14, 1994, Mr. Tycksen advised the
court that he did not file a written response as he felt the matter
had been resolved by discussions between counsel.

T-63.

Although

there was dispute between counsel as to what was agreed, it is
evident that following the court's entry of the order of the 27th
and

the

29th,

respectively,

that

an

objection

on

behalf

of

appellants was filed to the orders, (R-3265) , a hearing was held
thereon

(T-52) and the judge elected to strike a portion of the

suggested order based on the hearing. See Second Amended Order
under Decree paragraph 3, page 6 at R-3391.
Finding 12 (R-3389) challenged under this subdivision II. d.,
if left to stand, will not affect the rights of appellants as
against appellees should other findings, as challenged here, be
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removed.

However, the findings should not be allowed to suggest

that no action was taken by appellants when, in fact, substantial
effort to prevent the entry of the findings and conclusions was
made.
POINT III
THE PROCEEDINGS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL FOR EADAC, ERNEST
AND ANGELA PSARRAS FOR A BAR ORDER WERE NEITHER NECESSARY
NOR RELEVANT TO A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BELOW,
ESPECIALLY UPON REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL LEASING, INC.,
AND WENDELL LEWIS BUTCHER THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO
A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION.
By

way

of

pleadings filed

communication

to

opposing

counsel

(T-62) , by

(R-3266) and by way of argument of counsel for

Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing (T-75), appellants stated they
had no objection to a dismissal, with prejudice so long as the
prejudice ran strictly to the issues in the case raised by the
pleadings before the court and appellants' claims against appellees
were preserved.
During the course of argument Mr. Parry, appellees counsel,
even advised the court that the resolution proposed under the order
(entered December 27, 1993 and also December 29, 1993)

would not

preclude the rights of Mr. Butcher or Federal Leasing to proceed
against defendants in other actions.

T-97-98.

Consequently the

need for findings of fact and conclusions of law attempting to
adjudicate rights and claims of Butcher and Federal Leasing, vis a
vie EADAC and Psarrases under the April 22, 1991 Agreement, was not
necessary and in fact the case could have been resolved by a mere
dismissal

with

prejudice

of

the

action

as

Appellants counsel so advised the court. T-75.
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to

all

parties.

Appellants did,

however, object to any entry of an order relative to any issues
that had not been properly brought before the court. R-3266 and T68; 73.
Dismissal
ineffective.

of

a

lawsuit

not

joined

by

all

parties

is

Erickson v. One Thirty-Three, Inc. and Associates,

766 P. 2d. 898, 899 (Nev. 1988).

Where a trial court attempts to

place

a dismissal

terms

or

conditions

upon

order, which

are

unacceptable to a party, the objecting party is then entitled to
elect to proceed with the litigation.

Powers v. Professional Rodeo

Cowboys' Assoc., 832 P. 2d 1099, 1104 (Colo. App. 1992).
In the instant case, the terms and conditions of the dismissal
were

objectionable

persuaded

by

what

to

appellants.

appellants

assert

The
to

court
be

apparently

was

insubstantial

and

incompetent evidence that the rights and claims of appellants had
been terminated and declared invalid in foreign courts.
As set forth in Point II of appellants' brief the evidence was
neither

substantial

nor was

it

competent,

and

appellants

had

objected to the dismissal under the terms and conditions.
If it is true that the appellants had no further rights under
The Agreement, and that every right and claim of appellants against
EADAC and Psarrases had been adjudicated either in the Texas court
or the bankruptcy court or both, then of course the decision of the
court to allow dismissal without the appellants' challenge would be
appropriate, provided the appellants had been given due process as
to the

issues

raised

against

them with meaningful

opportunity for hearing, including discovery.
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notice

and

See Wiscombe v.

Wiscombe, supra.

However, the court not only dismissed the case

but made findings affecting substantive rights of the appellants
without the issues having been properly framed and brought before
the court.

See Point I.

Perhaps the honorable judge in striking paragraph 3 of the
second Amended Order was of the opinion that he was reserving the
rights

of the appellants.

R-3359

record, in not authenticated.)

(The note, although

in the

However, the fact remains that he

left intact those findings and conclusions as previously addressed
(See Point II) which appear to have decided the effect of the Texas
and bankruptcy cases on the appellants' rights.
The

court's

alternative

dismissal

set

forth by

dismissal

without

was

the

to

accept

plaintiff,

indication

of

the

the

i.e.,

an

effect

conditions

of

unconditional

of

any

outside

proceedings upon the dismissal or refuse to grant the dismissal and
allow the issues raised to be properly presented to the court by
way

of

proposed

discovery

for

meaningful

amendment

due process

time

and

with
with

the

protection

opportunity

in a meaningful manner.

of

to be
See

rights
heard

at

of
a

Powers v.

Professional Rodeo Cowboys' Assoc., supra, Pacheco v. Martinez,
supra and Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, supra.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

as above

stated,

appellants

respectfully

request that the above entitled court vacate the findings of fact
and conclusions of law entered in the court below, or that the
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court either reinstate the matter to allow the parties, appellants
and appellees, EADAC,

Ernest and Angela Psarras, to amend the

pleadings and allow issues therein to be raised to be reasonably
presented, discovery to be had and an adjudication to be made.
Alternatively,

appellants

request,

that

an

order

be

entered

dismissing the case with prejudice as to the issues that have been
properly framed and raised in the proceeding below, reserving to
appellants such rights, claims and defenses as may exist between
them and appellees.
Dated this ^ 7 day of October 1994

J^y IV. /Birney,
)rniy for Appellants
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